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Abstract This paper studies the asset side market discipline effect in Mexico, whether 
borrowers pay higher interest rates (price‑based mechanism) to high‑quality banks, and 
consequently, whether borrowers discipline their banks. Borrowers continuously require credit 
and they choose large banks because their lending activity is trustworthy (a reinancing‑solvency 
motive). In addition, borrowers prefer banks with lower loan losses to signal their creditworthiness 
to other stakeholders (a certiication‑signaling motive). Using a sample of 37 banks over the 
years 2008 to 2012 and a dynamic panel model, we found evidence in favor of these motives 
through a price‑based mechanism, that is, the Mexican borrowers are willing to pay higher rates 
to larger banks with higher capital ratios and reserves for loan losses, or lower nonperforming 
loans. As a result, the Mexican banks face market discipline induced by borrowers, albeit this 
discipline is absent in retail and largest banks.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Disciplina de mercado en bancos mexicanos: evidencia desde el lado de los activos
Resumen El artículo estudia el efecto de la disciplina de mercado desde el lado de los activos en 
México, si los prestatarios pagan tasas de interés más altas (mecanismo basado en precio) a bancos de 
alta calidad, y consecuentemente, si los prestatarios disciplinan sus bancos. Los prestatarios conti-
nuamente requieren crédito y preieren bancos grandes porque su actividad prestamista es coniable 
(un motivo de reinanciamiento‑solvencia). También los prestatarios preieren bancos con menores 
pérdidas crediticias para señalizar su solvencia a otros prestamistas (un motivo de certiicación‑seña-
lización). Con una muestra de 37 bancos durante el periodo 2008 a 2012 y un modelo con datos de 
panel dinámico, se encontró evidencia a favor de dichos motivos a través de un mecanismo basado en 
precio, es decir, los prestatarios mexicanos están dispuestos a pagar tasas más altas a bancos más 
grandes, con mayores ratios de capital y reservas para pérdidas crediticias, o con carteras vencidas 
más bajas. Como resultado, los bancos mexicanos enfrentan disciplina de mercado inducida por los 
prestatarios, aunque esta disciplina está ausente en bancos de consumo y en los más grandes.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
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1. Introduction
The banking system is a key component of any modern 
economy, and it is a determinant of the process of economic 
growth and development. The real estate sector immedia‑
tely suffers when the inancial sector has problems and in a 
globalized world this chaos is transcended quickly among 
countries. Due to the financial and banking crisis the 
economists have studied which factors influence in the 
soundness of the banks. With an international perspective, 
the recommendations of the Basel Committee have a special 
inluence on the management of the banks. The Committee 
points out three Pillars for better performance: 1) Minimum 
Capital Requirements, 2) Supervisory Review Process, and 
3) Market Discipline or Disclosure Requirements (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). Nevertheless, we 
are still suffering from the banking crisis and expensive 
state rescues. 
This paper relates to the Third Pillar of Basel, in which the 
liability side of market discipline effect has been well 
investigated. The major indings suggest that the depositors 
monitor their banks, albeit this discipline has been 
diminished by the introduction of deposit insurance. In 
banking markets, with information asymmetry problems, 
the recommendation for policymakers is to improve the 
disclosed information of the banks as it allows for accurate 
decision making, and the depositors can discipline their 
banks.
On the other side, the asset market discipline effect has 
been little studied. For that reason, this paper is motivated 
by the following question: do borrowers pay higher interest 
rates to high‑quality banks? If the answer is positive, it 
means that the banks are partially disciplined by borrowers. 
Kim et al. (2005) explored a similar question in Norway. 
They found positive evidence for a certiication‑signaling 
motive: borrowers choose banks with lower loan losses 
because they want to signal their creditworthiness to other 
stakeholders. Theoretically, the borrowers also have a 
reinancing‑solvency motive: borrowers prefer high‑quality 
banks with more assets and higher capital ratios because 
they continuously need credit, and it is better to request 
this credit from high‑quality banks because their lending 
activity is trustworthy. Thus, banks grant credits to 
economic agents and monitor them, but borrowers are also 
interested in keeping an eye on the banks.
Mexico was chosen as the most suitable country for 
exploring this research question because its banking system 
has only been privatized relatively recently (in 1991) and 
unfortunately its people had already experienced a inancial 
crisis in 1994-1995. Furthermore, its banks were bailed out 
in 1997. As a part of the liberalization of the economy and 
globalization, in the beginning of the 1990s the Mexican 
government privatized the commercial banks that it had 
expropriated in 1982 (due to debt crisis), but the result was 
a inancial crisis and the collapse of the banking system. 
Consequently, Mexico rescued the banks that it had just 
privatized. The Mexican government reformed the accoun‑
ting rules and reorganized the country’s deposit insurance 
system, where bank deposits were insured by a Trust Fund 
(the Fund for the Protection of Bank Savings, known by its 
Spanish acronym, FOBAPROA, which was replaced in 1999 by 
the Bank Savings Protection Institute, known by its acronym, 
IPAB).1 To modernize the Mexican banks (as a political 
speech) the last 15 years of this procedure have been 
accompanied by strong foreign investment, especially from 
American and Spanish banks. However, these banks have 
been criticized because they are risk averse and make fewer 
loans to household and business enterprises (Haber, 2005). 
In this context, the results of this investigation can support 
the intention of the Mexican policymakers to promote 
disclosure of banking information. The indings can also help 
to understand the market discipline in other countries. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briely 
discusses the theoretical relationship between banks, 
depositors, borrowers and market discipline, with special 
attention on the asset side effect, empirical studies and the 
major indings for Mexico; section 3 describes the data sets, 
a sample of 37 Mexican banks for the period of 2008-2012; 
section 4 speciies an econometric model (dynamic panel) 
and it reports and discusses the results. Finally, conclu-
sions and proposals for future research are outlined.
2. Brief review of literature
After the inancial crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, and with 
the current financial crisis (which usually included the 
banking crisis), economists, bankers and international orga‑
nizations remarked the need to understand the determinants 
of stability in the banking system. In this context, the Basel 
principles play an important role, and among other deter‑
minants, the literature highlights the Third Pillar of Basel: 
Market Discipline.2
In a wide sense, market discipline is the performance of 
the market mechanism, which is studied in the well known 
model of supply and demand. Nevertheless, in the banking 
literature, market discipline is usually understood as the 
capability of bank creditors to discipline banks “that engage 
in excessive risk‑taking, by demanding higher interest rates 
or by withdrawing their deposits” (Demirgüç‑Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999, p. 8).3 Maybe, due to this deinition, the 
liability side of market discipline effect has been extensively 
studied in the banking literature (see for example, Calomiris 
and Kahn 1991; Park, 1995; Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Park and 
Peristiani, 1998; Flannery, 1998; Caprio and Honohan, 2004; 
Flannery and Nikolova, 2004).
The economists in particular have studied the links 
between market discipline (liability side), regulation, 
supervision, deposit insurance and transparency. We expect 
that market discipline complements regulation and 
supervision, and also that transparency provides agents with 
more information to monitor their banks.4 In addition, 
1. IPAB provides limited insurance, around 1.9 million Mexican pe-
sos per depositor and bank in July 2012 On the contrary, FOBAPROA 
implicitly protected 100% of deposits.
2. Detragiache and Demirgüç‑Kunt (2010) did not ind support for 
the hypothesis that better compliance with Basel principles results 
in sounder banks.
3. A third mechanism to discipline banks from the liability side is 
the maturity shifts of the deposit (Murata and Hori, 2006; Semeno-
va, 2007).
4. Nevertheless, Semenova (2012) did not ind evidence on the 
positive effect of transparency on market discipline.
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deposit insurance can stabilize economies by limiting bank 
runs, but its relationship with the market discipline involves 
a meticulous discussion. Nowadays, explicitly or implicitly, 
many countries guarantee bank debt, which can reduce 
agents’ motivation to monitor their banks. There is evidence 
showing that in the presence of explicit deposit insurance 
the market discipline has been diminished depending on the 
credibility of the system (Demirgüç‑Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
2004; Hosono et al., 2004; Ioannidou and de Dreu, 2006; 
Karas et al., 2010). A general accepted conclusion is that 
creditors monitor banks, but the degree to which they do so 
differs across deposit insurance schemes and countries.
In Mexico, Martinez‑Peria and Schmukler (2001, see 
Table V, p. 1041) found evidence of the presence of the 
market discipline liability side effect, particularly in 
the post‑crisis period. The authors employed a regression 
analysis, covering a period of 1991 to 1996, where the 
dependent variables are the growth of the deposits and 
the implicit interest rate on deposits, and the main 
explanatory variables are measures of bank risk: capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and 
liquidity (known as the CAMEL rating system). Furthermore, 
the authors found that deposit insurance did not dimi-
nish the extent of market discipline. It means that the 
discipline is supported particularly by depositors, for whom 
the state guarantees are insuficient or unrealistic.
Hosono et al. (2004, see Table A1, p. 60) found mixed 
evidence of market discipline in Mexico. Over the regression 
covering the period of 1992‑2002, they found a positive 
signiicant inluence of bank’s liquidity on the interest rate 
of deposits, but usually it is expected that banks with liquid 
assets are safer. For that reason they may pay lower interest 
rates on deposits. On the contrary, they found evidence of 
market discipline because more eficient and larger banks 
pay lower rates.
On the other hand, the asset side market discipline effect 
has been briely studied in the banking literature. Allen et 
al. (2011)5 developed a theoretical model in which the 
discipline also comes from the asset side. The authors argue 
that in recent years the banks have been choosing capital 
ratios above regulatory minimums because of market 
discipline. Although this does not mean that they were well 
capitalized. Allen et al. (2011, p. 984) point out that “when 
credit markets are competitive, market discipline coming 
from the asset side induces banks to hold positive levels of 
capital as a way of committing to monitor and attract 
borrowers”. In particular, their model considers the case 
when the banks operate in a perfectly competitive loan 
market, but it is extensive to study other market structures, 
with or without deposit insurance, and it compares market 
and regulatory solutions. It is noteworthy that the model 
has an asset side incentive to hold capital, since the market 
equilibrium entails a combination of capital and loan rate 
that maximizes borrower surplus. 
As an empirical implication “the model suggests that 
greater credit market competition increases capital holdings 
as it introduces market discipline from the asset side… 
Banks that are more involved in monitoring‑intensive 
5. The irst version of the work of Allen et al. (2011) was presen-
ted in 2005 as a working paper in the Center for Financial Studies.
lending should be more capitalized. Similarly, firms for 
which monitoring adds the most value should prefer to 
borrow from banks with high capital” (p. 986). In other 
words, banks with a large amount of capital are more 
attractive for borrowers, and greater monitoring is desirable 
from the borrower’s perspective. “Market discipline is 
imposed from the asset side as both the loan rate and the 
bank’s capital are used to provide banks with monitoring 
incentives” (p. 991). Borrowers prefer lower interest rates 
and large amounts of capital, and banks prefer the opposite.
Fischer et al. (2012), in line with Allen et al. (2011), 
investigate whether banks charge higher loan spreads due 
to these high capital ratios. Their findings show positive 
evidence (they used 21,053 American syndicated loans 
agreements undertaken by public and non‑inancial listed 
companies during the period of 1993‑2007). Fang (2005) also 
found that reputable investment banks charge higher fees. 
On the contrary, Hubbard et al. (2002), Steffen and 
Wahrenburg (2008) and Santos and Winton (2009) found that 
banks with low capital ratios charge higher loan rates than 
well capitalized banks, particularly to small firms. This 
result is consistent with the theoretical models of Boot et 
al. (1993) and Diamond and Rajan (2000), in which the 
banks transmit the cost of funds and extract more rents 
from bank‑dependent irms with low cash low.6
Similarly, Cook et al. (2003) and Kim et al. (2005) examine 
whether borrowers pay higher rates to high‑quality banks, 
in accordance with the literature on reputational signaling.7 
Cook et al. (2003) explore a certiication‑signaling motive: 
whether borrowers prefer higher reputation banks to signal 
their creditworthiness to other stakeholders, theoretically 
banks have the best information about the economic 
conditions of the borrowers and their projects. In order for 
a bank to grant a loan, irst it must thoroughly investigate 
the borrower and then mitigate the asymmetric information. 
The outsiders can make decisions based on decisions of the 
bankers.8
Cook et al. (2003) developed a regression analysis based 
on a sample of 635 American credit arrangements from 
1986 to l994. The explained variable is the rate spread over 
LIBOR and the explanatory variables are the lender’s 
Standard and Poor’s senior debt rating, the lender’s size 
(natural log of assets), and other borrower’s characteristics 
and financial environment. The findings show positive 
evidence for the certiication‑signaling motive.
Kim et al. (2005) explore the certification‑signaling 
motive, and a refinancing‑solvency motive: whether 
borrowers prefer high quality banks (well capitalized and 
diversiied, with a good solvency and size) because they can 
need credit in the future, and whether it is better to obtain 
credit from a bank that already knows the borrower, 
6. It is interesting to note that in an analysis of the same period 
(1987‑1992), the findings of Fischer et al. (2012) coincide with 
Hubbard et al. (2002).
7. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) study the reputation of the 
banks, and they developed a theoretical model in which entrepre-
neurs are willing to pay a higher interest rate to borrow from repu-
table banks, due to a reinancing motive.
8. For a thorough discussion of certiication motive, the reader 
may refer to Booth and Smith (1986), James (1987), Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) and Billett et al. (1995).
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because this bank will be able to extend credit and new 
loans rapidly, particularly in the event of inancial distress.9
If borrowers pay a premium to get this certiication and 
refinancing, it means that banks face market discipline 
induced by borrowers. To explore these hypotheses Kim et 
al. (2005) elaborated a model in which the dependent 
variable is the spread of interest rates on credit lines over 
the money market rate. And the main explanatory variables, 
indicating the quality of a bank, are the capital ratio, loan 
losses, and size. But, the model includes other independent 
variables like geographic location, market concentration 
and time dummies for macroeconomic effects. The authors 
used a panel of annual data covering Norwegian banks 
between 1993 and 1998 (after the banking crisis in Norway). 
The sample includes a maximum of 121 banks in 1998 and a 
minimum of 108 in 1994, counting small local savings banks 
and large nationwide banks, from 19 counties. 
With two‑stage least square (to instrument with its own lag 
the independent control variable ratio of materials and wage 
cost to loans outstanding), Kim et al. (2005) found that the 
coeficients of the variables relating to banks’ future lending 
capacity (capital ratio and size) are not signiicant. As a result 
they did not find evidence for the refinancing hypothesis. 
Norwegian borrowers do not care about bank characteristics 
indicating the grade that a bank will be able to stay behind its 
borrowers to extend loans in the future. But, the coeficient 
of loan loss provision is signiicant, that is, borrowers care 
about the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio supporting the 
certiication hypothesis. “Borrowers’ appreciation of banks 
with low loss provisions serves as an important disciplinary 
device, inducing banks to avoid losses” (p. 694).
There are various papers studying whether borrowers 
(usually syndicated loans undertaken by irms) pay higher 
rates to high‑quality banks, but it appears that Kim et al. 
(2005) is the only existing work empirically exploring and 
interpreting this nexus as evidence of the asset side market 
discipline effect. Therefore, this paper contributes to the 
empirical literature in two ways. First, it employs panel data 
in a dynamic model with a GMM estimator (generalized 
method of moments). Second, the econometric test includes 
a sample of Mexican banks that had been not studied before.
3. Data
Mexican banks are required to disclose their financial 
statements to the Central Bank of Mexico (CBM) and this 
information is available on its web site. The data used in this 
investigation are drawn from the National Banking and 
Securities Commission (known by its Spanish acronym, CNBV). 
This agency oversees Mexican banks. The analysis is based 
upon data recorded on a monthly or quarterly basis over the 
period December, 2008 to March, 2012, covering 37 banks 
(Mexico currently has 42 banks in operation, but the complete 
statistics for 5 investment banks were unavailable). 
The original panel data of banks is unbalanced because 
some banks were removed, merged or founded. Nevertheless, 
9. For further discussion about reinancing motive, see Sharpe 
(1990), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Detragiache et al. 
(2000).
the econometric tests of this paper only analyze banks in 
operation during the complete period. This time period was 
chosen for study because after the banking crisis the inancial 
agents learned the importance of the market discipline, a 
wake‑up call as proposed by Martinez‑Peria and Schmukler 
(2001), and the recent financial crisis in USA and Europe, 
where large banks were bailed out by their governments. This 
reminded us that the banks can fail.
As is suggested by Kim et al. (2005), the interest rate on 
credit works through a price‑based discipline mechanism. It 
allows us to explore whether borrowers are willing to pay a 
higher rate because of high‑quality characteristics of the 
banks. But, in the data here this interest rate is not 
available, and the 12 month implicit interest rate (PRICE) 
has been employed as a proxy, i.e., the amount of income 
due to credit divided by the amount of credit. A similar 
strategy is frequently used in the literature on the liability 
side of market discipline effect.10
The explanatory variables are capital ratio (CAPITALR) 
deined as capital divided by assets, bank’s size (SIZE) deined 
as total assets, reserve for loan losses (RESERVE) deined as 
the balance at quarter end of provisions for possible credit 
losses div ided by the nonperforming loans,  and 
nonperforming loans divided by total loans, expressed as a 
percentage (DOUBTFUL). Higher values of CAPITALR, SIZE 
and RESERVE, and lower values of DOUBTFUL presumably 
indicate high‑quality banks for borrowers.
As a irst step the data removing outliers (possibly due to 
reporting or recording errors) has been reviewed. Table 1 
summarizes descriptive statistics. Mexican banks have 
presence over all Mexican regions, but they are different, 
with a large dispersion of their characteristics. For example, 
in the period of analysis we have a bank reporting capital of 
108 million Mexican pesos and total assets of 136 million 
(Banco Facil) and banks reporting capital of 146,238 million 
pesos (Banamex) and total assets of 1,295,406 million pesos 
(BBVA Bancomer). For that reason four subsamples have been 
included in the analysis, to take into account these 
differences and the nature of the banks, following the 
classiication of the CBM. The irst subsample contains 7 of 
the largest banks (G7), they are usually a cutoff point in the 
reports of the CBM and they control around 80% of the assets 
in the banking system at the end of the irst quarter of 2012. 
The second subsample includes 9 retail banks, which 
specialize in transactions with consumers. The third 
subsample includes 14 commercial banks with typical 
activities, but smaller than the G7. And inally, the fourth 
subsample contains 7 investment banks, working in the 
issuance of securities.
In the full sample (37 banks), as is expected, the retail 
banks show the highest implicit interest rate (PRICE), the 
mean being 38.9%, but Banco Azteca, for example, borrowed 
funds up to 90%. The lower implicit interest rate corresponds 
to the investment banks at 7.3%, the commercial banks 
borrowed at 10.8% and the G7 at 11.9%.
On the average the capital ratio (CAPITALR) of the Mexican 
banks is 0.16, the maximum is 0.80, and the minimum is 
10. It is important to recognize that in the presence of imperfect 
information the price‑based mechanism might be biased (Park, 
1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998).
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0.01, where the retail banks present the highest ratios (the 
mean is 0.28). The overall mean RESERVE is 815 points, with 
a range of 45 to 57772, where the investment banks present 
the highest values, but these maximum values must be 
treated with caution because information was found on 
RESERVE for two investment banks only (The Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Monex). The overall mean DOUBTFUL is 4.4%, 
with a range of 0.01% to 30.2%, where the maximum values 
correspond to the retail banks.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the main variables 
employed in the econometric models in the next section 
(the variables measured in logarithms – Ln have been 
included). In general, the coeficients of correlation suggest 
a low relationship between the variables (these increased in 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sample 37 banks
Implicit interest rate on creditsa (PRICE) 497 17.38 17.50 1.81 90.64
Capitalb 518 14382.08 29507.19 108.88 146238.90
Capital ratioa (CAPITALR) 518 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.80
Reserve for loan lossa (RESERVE) 405 815.23 4602.15 45.34 57772.31
Nonperforming loansa (DOUBTFUL) 405 4.42 4.97 0.01 30.27
Assetsb (SIZE) 518 138130.40 277281.20 136.74 1295406.00
Subsample G7 banks
Implicit interest rate on creditsa (PRICE)  98 11.89 2.20 7.32 17.53
Capitalb  98 65720.71 36526.64 23848.66 146238.90
Capital ratioa (CAPITALR)  98 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.23
Reserve for loan lossa (RESERVE)  98 214.36 130.59 96.75 724.46
Nonperforming loansa (DOUBTFUL)  98 2.82 1.07 1.18 6.43
Assetsb (SIZE)  98 609098.10 359023.90 146905.20 1295406.00
Banamex, Banorte, BBVA Bancomer, HSBC, Inbursa, Santander, and Scotiabank
Subsample Retail banks
Implicit interest rate on creditsa (PRICE) 124 38.90 24.03 8.22 90.64
Capitalb 126 1959.32 1845.34 108.88 6642.77
Capital ratioa (CAPITALR) 126 0.28 0.19 0.07 0.80
Reserve for loan lossa (RESERVE) 126 168.49 75.15 81.08 472.75
Nonperforming loansa (DOUBTFUL) 126 8.29 7.13 0.44 30.27
Assetsb (SIZE) 126 13375.12 19740.22 136.74 81243.13
American Express, Autoin, Banco Azteca, Bancoppel, Compartamos, Banco Fácil, Banco Ahorro Famsa, Volkswagen Bank,  
and Banco Wal-Mart
Subsample Commercial banks
Implicit interest rate on creditsa (PRICE) 184 10.78 3.67 2.37 29.28
Capitalb 196 2381.05 2421.69 325.38 11095.35
Capital ratioa (CAPITALR) 196 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.57
Reserve for loan lossa (RESERVE) 154 268.36 707.80 45.34 7875.31
Nonperforming loansa (DOUBTFUL) 154 2.89 2.08 0.03 17.42
Assetsb (SIZE) 196 32122.25 28323.21 648.73 92930.45
ABC Capital, Airme, Banco del Bajío, Banregio, Bansí, CIBanco, Interacciones, Inter Banco, Invex, Ixe, Banca Mifel, Multiva, 
Bank of Tokyo‑Mitsubishi Ufj, and Ve por Más
Subsample Investment banksc
Implicit interest rate on creditsa (PRICE)  91 7.33 2.04 1.81 11.03
Capitalb  98 3017.63 2332.55 413.34 8431.85
Capital ratioa (CAPITALR)  98 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.43
Reserve for loan lossa (RESERVE)  27 9133.44 15781.31 83.71 57772.31
Nonperforming loansa (DOUBTFUL)  27 0.98 1.10 0.01 3.63
Assetsb (SIZE)  98 39578.41 44060.55 987.91 198772.30
Actinver, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, ING, JP Morgan, Monex, and Royal Bank of Scotland
 aRatio. 
 bBalances at quarter end, in millions pesos. 
 cRESERVE and DOUBTFUL include only information of Monex and Royal Bank of Scotland. 
Source: Author’s calculations using CNBV data.
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Table 2 Correlation matrix (pairwise)
 PRICE CAPITALR SIZE RESERVE DOUBTFUL Lnprice Lncapitalr Lnsize Lnreserve Lndoubtful
Sample 37 banks
PRICE 1
CAPITALR 0.48 1
SIZE −0.12 −0.20 1
RESERVE −0.09 0.02 −0.07 1
DOUBTFUL 0.49 0.34 −0.18 −0.13 1
Lnprice 0.93 0.48 −0.04 −0.16 0.57 1
Lncapitalr 0.38 0.91 −0.15 0.06 0.31 0.39 1
Lnsize −0.25 −0.62 0.73 −0.13 −0.38 −0.22 −0.57 1
Lnreserve −0.16 0.10 −0.03 0.71 −0.32 −0.23 0.15 −0.12 1
Lndoubtful 0.39 0.13 −0.03 −0.59 0.72 0.50 0.10 −0.06 −0.81 1
Subsample G7 banks
PRICE 1
CAPITALR −0.56 1
SIZE 0.52 −0.52 1
RESERVE −0.50 0.64 −0.19 1
DOUBTFUL 0.29 −0.15 −0.22 −0.47 1
Lnprice 0.99 −0.62 0.53 −0.57 0.28 1
Lncapitalr −0.49 0.99 −0.46 0.60 −0.18 −0.55 1
Lnsize 0.55 −0.64 0.96 −0.20 −0.25 0.56 −0.59 1
Lnreserve −0.41 0.57 −0.06 0.96 −0.54 −0.48 0.54 −0.05 1
Lndoubtful 0.25 −0.12 −0.23 −0.52 0.97 0.23 −0.16 −0.27 −0.59 1
Subsample Retail banks
PRICE 1
CAPITALR 0.21 1
SIZE 0.53 −0.51 1
RESERVE −0.23 0.32 −0.15 1
DOUBTFUL 0.20 0.04 −0.14 −0.45 1
Lnprice 0.97 0.25 0.44 −0.20 0.32 1
Lncapitalr 0.02 0.95 −0.68 0.37 −0.02 0.06 1
Lnsize 0.28 −0.74 0.76 −0.16 −0.24 0.21 −0.77 1
Lnreserve −0.22 0.36 −0.15 0.96 −0.53 −0.21 0.41 −0.16 1
Lndoubtful 0.22 −0.07 0.03 −0.52 0.92 0.35 −0.17 −0.06 −0.56 1
Subsample Commercial banks
PRICE 1
CAPITALR 0.42 1
SIZE −0.15 −0.42 1
RESERVE 0.26 0.46 −0.17 1
DOUBTFUL 0.17 0.35 −0.23 −0.24 1
Lnprice 0.92 0.20 −0.03 0.26 0.22 1
Lncapitalr 0.25 0.91 −0.49 0.37 0.27 0.05 1
Lnsize −0.29 −0.75 0.87 −0.39 −0.31 −0.11 −0.76 1
Lnreserve 0.27 0.29 −0.09 0.72 −0.55 0.26 0.25 −0.24 1
Lndoubtful −0.04 −0.17 −0.07 −0.69 0.76 0.01 −0.12 0.08 −0.82 1
Subsample Investment banks
PRICE 1
CAPITALR 0.31 1
SIZE −0.09 −0.62 1
RESERVE 0.15 0.56 −0.50 1
DOUBTFUL −0.19 −0.58 0.71 −0.51 1
Lnprice 0.97 0.29 −0.09 0.07 −0.10 1
Lncapitalr 0.28 0.89 −0.79 0.57 −0.63 0.25 1
Lnsize −0.14 −0.80 0.84 −0.58 0.76 −0.15 −0.78 1
Lnreserve 0.12 0.68 −0.82 0.76 −0.86 0.01 0.71 −0.88 1
Lndoubtful 0.02 −0.68 0.76 −0.77 0.86 0.13 −0.71 0.85 −0.97 1
Source: Author’s calculations using CNBV data.
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logarithmic terms). On the one hand, these indings imply 
that econometric models will not have multicollinearity 
problems. But, in logarithmic terms a high correlation 
between RESERVE and DOUBTFUL was found. It is noteworthy 
that these indicators capture a similar characteristic but in 
the opposite direction. On the other hand, the low 
correlations between dependent and independent variables 
are not good news for the hypothesis of market discipline 
asset side effect.
4. Empirical model
After revising different econometric methodologies, and 
because previous econometric tests for market discipline 
employed the dependent variable as regressor, the best 
option is believed to be to test the presence of the asset 
side market discipline effect as the dynamic SYS GMM 
estimator, developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).11 This is 
because it uses a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of 
independence and homoscedasticity, and correcting 
problems of second-order serial correlation. The model is in 
levels, it allows for lagged values of the dependent variable 
to be entered as regressors, and it provides a better control 
of endogeneity for all explanatory variables because it uses 
lags of variables like instruments (in irst differences and 
levels).12 In addition, the explanatory variables are entered 
with a one‑year lag and in logarithms getting elasticity 
coeficients and linearity, see Model [1]. Note the use of the 
reduced-form specification extensively employed in the 
literature to test the liability side of market discipline 
effect. As Park (1995, p. 504) points out “ideally, we need to 
estimate a simultaneous equation model specifying demand 
and supply schedules. Identifying such structural‑form 
equations is dificult due to the lack of exogenous variables 
that strongly affect either the supply or just the demand”. 
But this approach is not based on supply and demand; but 
rather on the reinancing‑solvency and certiication‑signaling 
motives.
Lags of the independent variables have been used to 
prevent simultaneity and to account for the fact that the 
information is available to the borrowers with a certain delay. 
Nonetheless, it is important to notice that the dynamic SYS 
GMM estimator already prevents simultaneity and reverse 
11. At the start of the research models such as those in the work 
of Kim et al. (2005) were analyzed with random and ixed effects 
using the lags of the explanatory variables as instruments, but only 
the dependent variable as regressor showed signiicance. These re-
sults were interpreted as bad instrumental variables. As a result it 
was necessary to employ a dynamic model. Consequently, in order 
to resolve this dilemma a irst option was the DIF GMM developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), a model into irst differences. But, at 
present we have few observations and many individuals, as a result 
of the econometric literature, suggest the use of the estimator of 
Blundell and Bond (1998) adding moment conditions and instru-
ments with the model in levels.
12. We allow a maximum of 2 lags to be used as instruments to 
maintain a sensible relationship between the number of cross-sec-
tional observations and the number of over‑identifying restrictions. 
This can help to avoid the over‑itting biases that are sometimes 
associated with using all the available moment conditions.
causality. In this model it is assumed that the error term is 
not serially correlated, particularly, there is not a second 
order serial correlation and Sargan’s over‑identiication test 
is employed to validate the instruments.
LnDISCIPLINEit = r1LnDISCIPLINEit−1 + LnXit−4'b + BANKt'a + Tt't + uit (1)13
DISCIPLINE is the indicator of the price discipline 
mechanism (PRICE), X is a vector of explanatory variables: 
CAPITALR, SIZE, RESERVE and DOUBTFUL. But because of 
multicollinearity problems between RESERVE and DOUBTFUL 
they are included separately in the models. BANK is a 
dichotomous variable for each type of bank (G7, Commercial 
and Investment), where retail banks are the basic group, 
thus the model controls for bank characteristics and 
markets. T is a dummy variable for periods controlling the 
effects of unspeciied macroeconomic and inancial market 
conditions, which are assumed constant across banks.14
The fundamental hypothesis of interest is that DISCIPLINE 
depends positively upon the level of CAPITALR, SIZE 
(reinancing‑solvency motive) and RESERVE, also it depends 
inversely upon the level of DOUBTFUL (certiication‑signaling 
motive), which is interpreted as evidence of market 
discipline induced by borrowers. Consequently, the empirical 
results are robust for different indicators and samples of 
banks.
4.1. Price-based discipline mechanism
Model (2) shows the transformation of the Model (1) to 
examine the price-based discipline mechanism. The 
dependent variable is the implicit interest rate on credits 
(PRICE).
LnPRICEit = r1LnPRICEit−1 + b1LnCAPITALRit−4 + b2LnSIZEit−4 + 
+ b3LnRESERVEorDOUBTFULit−4 + BANKt'a + Tt't + uit
 (2)
Table 3 summarizes the main results. In columns there are 
results of the full sample and subsamples, with pair columns 
showing estimations substituting RESERVE by DOUBTFUL 
(due to multicollinearity). The explanatory variables are in 
rows. It is noteworthy that the dynamic panel is justiied, 
because in general the dependent variables as regressors 
show statistically significant coefficients. All reported 
estimations pass both the Sargan and the second order serial 
correlation tests at conventional signiicance levels. 
In the full sample (including 29 banks because of data 
limitations of some banks, especially investment banks) we 
13. The coefficients represent short‑run effects; the long‑run 
effects can be derived by dividing each of the coeficients by 1−r1 
(the coeficient of the lagged dependent variable).
14. Kim et al. (2005) included a Gini coeficient of the explanatory 
variables denoting the variability of the banks in the system. In the 
Mexican case it is not necessary, the dispersion and variability 
among banks is evident ‑ see Table 1. Besides, if we include these 
Gini coefficients we are inducing collinearity. Therefore, these 
kinds of independent variables were not included. Moreover, Kim et 
al. (2005) included an index of bank concentration, but this indica-
tor was not included so as to avoid collinearity and due to the fact 
that this effect is already captured by the variable SIZE as well as in 
the analysis of the subsamples.
Document downloaded from http://www.elsevier.es, day 16/05/2018. This copy is for personal use. Any transmission of this document by any media or format is strictly prohibited.
Market discipline in Mexican banks: Evidence from the asset side 179
found that capital ratio (CAPITALR) and total assets (SIZE) 
were entered with positive and statistically significant 
coeficients at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. Column (1) 
RESERVE and column (2) DOUBTFUL were also entered with 
statistically signiicant coeficients at the 1% level and with 
the expected sign. These indings suggest that in Mexico we 
have an asset side market discipline effect through 
price‑based mechanism. A borrower comparing all the banks 
in the system is willing to pay a higher rate to a high‑quality 
bank. Borrowers take into account the capital ratios and the 
bank’s size, thus indicating that the reinancing‑solvency 
motive is relevant for Mexican borrowers. Furthermore, the 
borrower’s choice also depends on loan losses. In other 
words, borrowers prefer banks with higher reserves for loan 
losses, or banks with lower nonperforming loans in accor‑
dance with the certiication‑signaling motive.
Nevertheless, the dichotomous variables for type of bank, 
particularly the commercial banks, show some positive and 
statistically signiicant coeficients, it means that in relation 
with the retails banks these other banks have a larger effect 
on implicit interest rate (as we already expected, because 
retail banks show higher implicit interest rates, see Table 1), 
besides, it implies that the result may be biased by some 
kinds of banks, in particular by the retail or commercial 
banks. As a consequence, in the analysis of the subsamples 
we found some mixed results.
First, the full sample and the subsample of commercial 
banks present similar results. Second, notice that in the 
subsample of retail banks, although DOUBTFUL enters with 
statistically signiicant coeficient at the 5% level and with 
the expected sign (column 6), in general the model lack 
significant relations, that is, for a borrower comparing 
among retail banks nothing is matter. Third, in the subsample 
of 7 largest banks (G7) the refinancing and certification 
motives are irrelevant, in other words, these motives lost 
sense if we are comparing only the largest banks.
Unfortunately, I did not ind information to elaborate the 
indicator RESERVE and DOUBTFUL for 5 investment banks; 
therefore in the column (9) I present a model including only 
capital ratios and bank’s size as key explanatory variables. 
The indings for the investment banks do not support the 
reinancing‑solvency motive, and it is not possible to argue 
that the Mexican investment banks with higher capital ratios 
charge higher or lower interest rates.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the implicit interest 
rate (PRICE) has been diminished (signiicant and negative 
coefficient of the time dummy in 2011), this could be a 
response to the crisis in USA and in Europe during the last 
Table 3 Market discipline from borrowers (PRICE - price-based discipline mechanism)
Pred  
Sign
Full Simple G7 Banks Retail  
Banks
Commercial  
Banks
Investment 
Banks
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lagged Dependent 0.80*** 0.85*** 0.58*** 0.52*** 1.08*** 1.04*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.90
(0.005) (0.004) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.07) (0.08) (0.73)
CAPITALR
+ 0.01* 0.02*** −0.20 −0.23 −0.87 −0.21 0.13** 0.18*** 0.22
(0.004) (0.004) (0.25) (0.24) (0.79) (0.70) (0.06) (0.04) (1.10)
SIZE + 0.02*** 0.02*** −0.16 −0.15 −0.20 −0.09 0.05 0.08*** 0.30
(0.005) (0.005) (0.43) (0.27) (0.22) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (1.01)
RESERVE
+ 0.03*** 0.06 0.29 0.03***
(0.001) (0.07) (0.21) (0.01)
DOUBTFUL
− −0.03*** −0.05 −0.11** −0.01
(0.001) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
G7 Banks 0.08 0.13
Investment Banks 0.01 0.05*
Commercial Banks 0.09*** 0.09***
Year 2010 0.003 0.01*** −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.002 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07
Year 2011 −0.01*** −0.0003 −0.01 −0.02 0.001 0.01 0.04*** −0.07 −0.02
Year 2012 −0.004 0.004 −0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 −0.09 DP
Observations 289 289 70 70 90 90 110 110 66
Period December, 2008 − March, 2012
N x T 29 × 13 29 × 13 7 × 13 7 × 13 9 × 13 9 × 13 11 × 13 11 × 13 7 × 13
Sargan test  
(p-value)
24.58 25.97 9.72e−25 3.98e−24 2.11 2.8 10.6 9.85 2.13
(0.43)  0.35)  (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99) (1.00)
First order serial 
correlation test (p−value)
−1.16
(0.24)
−1.26
(0.21)
−2.33
(0.02)
−1.84
(0.06)
0.78
(0.43)
0.29
(0.77)
−1.06
(0.29)
−1.08
(0.28)
−0.56
(0.57)
Second order serial 
correlation test (p-value)
1.59 1.56 0.30 0.41 −0.53 −0.15 0.92 0.95 0.21
(0.11) (0.12) (0.76) (0.67) (0.59) (0.88) (0.36) (0.34) (0.83)
Regressions are estimated using the dynamic SYS GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
In parentheses are standard errors. 
Year 2009 dropped (DP) because of collinearity. 
 *,** and *** indicate statistical signiicance at the (10%) [5%] and {1%} levels.
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4 years. But, this is not necessarily the case in the subsample 
of commercial banks (time dummies show signiicance and 
positive coeficients in 2010 and 2011). 
5. Conclusions
Market discipline plays a key role for the stability of the 
banking system and for the performance of the entire 
economy. The banking literature focuses on the liability side 
of market discipline effect and the main indings suggest 
that the depositors monitor their banks requiring higher 
interest rates from risky banks or withdrawing their deposits 
from banks with a low‑quality. In general, the introduction 
of deposit insurance improved the trust of the agents in the 
banking system, but it also diminished the liability side of 
market discipline effect.
On the contrary, the asset side market discipline effect has 
been little studied. Theoretically the borrowers also need 
high‑quality banks. On the one hand, borrowers have a 
reinancing‑solvency motive, that is to say, borrowers need 
credit now and in the future, and it is better and less costly 
to obtain this credit from high‑quality banks, from larger 
banks with higher capital ratios. This is because these banks 
imply solvency, a more diversified portfolio and low 
possibilities to reduce the lending activity. On the other 
hand, borrowers have a certification‑signaling motive to 
choose high‑quality banks, with larger reserves for loan losses 
and lower overdue loans, because this represents the ability 
of the bank to take on risks correctly and to exert corporate 
governance, which is a good signal for other stakeholders.
Borrowers paying higher interest rates to high‑quality 
banks indicate the presence of the asset side market 
discipline effect through a price‑based mechanism. In 
Norway, Kim et al. (2005) found evidence in favor of the 
certification motive only. In this paper the price-based 
discipline mechanism in Mexico has been examined, with an 
analysis of 37 banks in a dynamic panel model. The indings 
suggest that borrowers care about bank’s size and capital 
ratios; they are willing to pay a higher rate to a bank 
exhibiting these high‑quality characteristics (in favor of the 
reinancing‑solvency motive), and they also prefer banks 
with higher reserves for loan losses or lower nonperforming 
loans (in favor of the certiication‑signaling motive). As a 
consequence, one can argue that the Mexican borrowers 
discipline their banks through a price‑based discipline 
mechanism. But, the retail banks escape to this discipline, 
for a borrower (consumer) comparing among retail banks 
the refinancing and certification motives have no 
signiicance. Also, the 7 largest banks (G7) do not face this 
market discipline effect, on contrary the smaller commercial 
banks support the hypothesis. About investments banks it is 
dificult to pronounce a judgment due to data limitations.
The recommendation for policymakers is to enhance 
disclosure requirements in accordance with the Third Pillar 
of Basel towards more refined indicators of information, 
because both depositors and borrowers may use this 
information to monitor the banking system.
Future research for Mexico must attempt to investigate 
the price‑based discipline mechanism in more depth, using 
data that directly captures the interest rate on credits. 
Likewise, it is necessary to explore other control and 
instrumental variables, to test differences by type of 
borrower and analysis or conduct surveys based on data 
provided by the borrowers. Lastly, it is important to 
recognize that the structure of the market is relevant. 
Therefore we need to discuss what kind of market we are 
analyzing, what is offered and demanded in this market and 
whether the price of this service (or good) is a market price 
or is an administered price.
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